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ABSTRACT
We present an infinite-horizon model of moral standards where self-esteem and unconscious drives
play key roles. In the model, an individual receives random temptations (such as bribe offers) and
must decide which to resist. Individual actions depend both on conscious intent and a type reflecting
unconscious drives. Temptations yield consumption value, but keeping a good self-image (a high belief
of being the type of person that resists) yields self-esteem. We identify conditions for individuals to
build an introspective reputation for goodness ("moral capital") and for good actions to lead to a stronger
disposition to do good. Bad actions destroy moral capital and lock-in further wrongdoing. Economic
shocks that result in higher temptations have persistent effects on wrongdoing that fade only as new
generations replace the shocked cohorts. Small parametric differences across societies may lead to
large wrongdoing differentials, and societies with the same moral fundamentals may display different
wrongdoing rates depending on how much past luck has polarized the distribution of individual beliefs.
The model illustrates how optimal deterrence may change under endogenous moral costs and how
wrongdoing may be compounded as high temptation activities attract individuals with low moral capital.
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We investigate the dynamics of wrongdoing in a model where individual moral standards
emerge endogenously. We develop our framework in two parts. In the ￿rst part we investigate
individual-level incentives to adhere to a moral objective, and in the second part we aggregate
behavior to the level of a society in a demographic steady state. In our model, an in￿nitely
lived individual receives a sequence of stochastic consumption opportunities (￿temptations￿ )
and must decide which to resist, if any. The model is rooted on two fundamental assumptions.
The ￿rst is that individual actions when facing temptation depend not just on conscious
intentions but also on unconscious impulses. The second is that the individual, although
aware that temptations are enjoyable, also derives utility from thinking she has ￿a good
heart.￿In other words, she would like to be the type of person whose unconscious nature is
geared towards rejecting temptations.
The idea that people may have an incentive to behave morally because they want to
maintain a high opinion of themselves is old ￿it goes back at least to Adam Smith￿ s Theory
of Moral Sentiments. But it poses immediate challenges. How are opinions on the self
anchored, and when will individuals prefer to forgo enjoyable consumption for the sake of
self-image? After all, a life of mischief may be rewarding, too. Second, will behavior that is
driven by an introspective reputation be self-reinforcing? Third, what are the implications for
the social dynamics of wrongdoing when individuals balance self-esteem with consumption-
based utility?
We derive the individual￿ s optimal policy and isolate conditions under which (i) individ-
uals resist actions that are deemed immoral but yield consumption value, (ii) individuals
improve their self-image by resisting immoral actions, and (iii) an improvement in self-image
strengthens the inclination to resist immoral actions, while events that damage self-image
weaken the inclination to act morally. A self-reinforcing path of wrongdoing results. An ex-
ample is that of a person who, perhaps because the country is going through hard times, faces
a surge in temptations. Under hardship, a person may do things that erode her self-image,
such as taking a bribe. A damaged self-image reduces the incentive to behave morally, even
after economic conditions have returned to normality. These results require speci￿c condi-
tions, both in terms of the preferences over self-image as well as in terms of what actions are
more likely to reveal information about the self.
In the second part of the paper we derive the aggregate wrongdoing rate in a society in
demographic steady state, and then perform comparative statics and impulse-response type
1exercises. For instance, a higher distribution of temptations yields more wrongdoing not just
because temptations are in average higher, but because it triggers an endogenous decrease
in individual moral standards. This result highlights how small di⁄erences in fundamentals
across societies may create relatively large di⁄erences in wrongdoing rates. We also show
how shocks that trigger wrongdoing during a ￿crisis￿period will continue to raise wrong-
doing rates well after the economy has got back to normal. In addition, wrongdoing across
societies may not respond solely to ￿moral fundamentals￿such as the share of ￿good￿vs.
￿bad￿people, but to events in the past that have polarized the beliefs that individuals hold
about themselves. Our model yields conditions for the emergence of phenomena such as
taboos and the use of harsher punishments for repeat o⁄enders. The latter result illustrates
the important point that optimal deterrence schemes may shift when moral standards are en-
dogenous. We also explain why ￿high temptation￿activities (such as politics) could attract
individuals with low moral standards, making such activities conducive to high wrongdoing
not just through their stronger temptations but also because they attract the individuals
least equipped to resist them.
It is important to note that we do not attempt to explain the content of morality. We take
it as given that individuals believe that utilizing certain consumption opportunities is wrong,
and that goodness is the feature of types who do not do wrong. The content of morality
may follow from evolutionary forces, and be transmitted by culture and parental authority.
The question of why people derive utility from thinking that they are good and what counts
as wrongdoing is beyond the scope of our enquiry. We study the determination of moral
standards, seen as the degree of adherence to established moral principles. This is important
because there is indication that moral standards are both endogenous and important for
behavior.
First, there is evidence that intrinsic motivations, and in particular notions of what is
right and what constitutes a duty, can be important determinants of behavior. For example,
experimental evidence indicates that people are willing to give up consumption in exchange
for avoiding telling lies (Gneezy 2005), and for imparting justice in the form of punish-
ment against those who ￿misbehave￿(Ostrom, Walker and Gardner 1992, Fehr and G￿chter
2002).1 Second, there is a revealed preference argument for the idea that moral costs are
1Fisman and Miguel (2007) show that tra¢ c violations correlate with national origin even when individuals
share the same environment. One interpretation is that intrinsic aspects of motivation that are culturally
de￿ned a⁄ect dispositions towards wrongdoing. Also, considerations of fairness appear to vary across cultures,
and a⁄ect how individuals distribute resources (Heinrich and Smith 2004).
2both important and predictably sensitive to intervention. Nontrivial amounts of resources
are spent with the objective of shaping moral costs. Parental discourse toward children, and
expenditures in education (from the elementary level to MBA Ethics courses) are arguably
serving the purpose of having individuals internalize moral standards. However, many mod-
els in economics and politics studying wrongdoing (crime, tax evasion, corruption) tend to
consider ￿moral costs￿a given.2 As will be illustrated by our model, the optimal design of
deterrence mechanisms may change once we incorporate the fact that moral standards are
endogenous.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section o⁄ers an overview of our model
and of the related literature. Section 3 presents our basic model featuring the problem of
an individual. Section 4 aggregates the problem of individuals and studies determinants of
wrongdoing rates at the social level. Section 5 provides applications and Section 6 concludes.
2 Overview of the model and related literature
In our model, in￿nitely-lived individuals receive an independently and randomly drawn con-
sumption opportunity, or temptation, in each period. Individuals may resist the temptation
or succumb to it. Individuals have time-consistent preferences and an unconscious type that
may be good or bad. Good types always adhere to the moral principle of resisting tempta-
tions. Individuals do not know their type, but hold beliefs about the probability that they
are good. These beliefs constitute individuals￿self-image, an introspective reputation that
gets tarnished when deviating from what good types would do. Similarly to K‰ oszegi (2006),
we assume that individuals derive utility not just from consumption but also from self-image
and that they may be risk averse with respect to that self-image.
In a standard model where intent to resist translates always into actual resistance, every
individual could behave as a good type, but then resistance could not be taken as evidence
that one has the good type. In our model, however, bad individuals cannot be certain to
behave well even when they try, so good behavior does convey information about a person￿ s
type. This is due to an important aspect of our model, namely that individuals have limited
control over their actions. In our model individuals choose whether they intend to actively
resist the temptation, or to give up. Giving up leads to one￿ s type determining one￿ s action,
while a bad type could fall for the temptation even when trying to resist. As a consequence,
2A classic reference in the economic theory of crime is Becker (1968). His model (and much subsequent
work) posits an exogenous parameter for an individual￿ s inherent disposition to commit crimes.
3the individual can infer something about her type after observing her own actions: after all,
her actions may have been a⁄ected not by her intent, of which she is conscious, but by her
type, of which she is not.
This framework helps think about the Weberian account of the Calvinist Ethic, according
to which individuals are born saved or damned, but do not know their predestination status.
Given that uncertainty, the account goes, individuals resist mundane temptations in order
to reduce their fear that they were born damned. Thus individuals resist temptations in
order to maintain and even improve their self-image. An immediate question is: how can the
Weberian Calvinist improve her own con￿dence of having been born saved when her good
actions were deliberately chosen to convince herself that she is saved?3 In our model, the
reason why con￿dence on having a good type can improve after good behavior is that the
individual does not select her actions exclusively through conscious deliberation. Rather,
she can only select her intent, and in each period she may su⁄er an independent random
disturbance allowing her type to ￿defeat￿her intent and determine the action. This lack of
perfect correlation between intent and actions is dubbed ￿imperfect free will￿throughout
the paper.
Is it reasonable to assume that individuals are not in full control of their own actions?
A large literature in psychology has documented the role of visceral impulses and uncon-
scious bias in decision-making. For example, Berridge (2003) discusses how the mesolimbic
dopamine system causes ultimate decisions to re￿ ect unconscious drives, thereby introducing
a wedge between what we ￿ like￿(or what we would like to want) and what we actually ￿ want.￿
(For a previous model where decisions are a⁄ected by unconscious ￿ gut￿feelings, see Prelec
and Bodner 2003. On visceral impulses see also, i.a., Loewenstein 1996, and Bernheim and
Rangel 2004 for a model of addiction rooted in the neuroscience of impulse control). The per-
manent nature of unconscious drives is what is captured in one￿ s type, while period-speci￿c,
random factors alter the strength of those drives. The view in the paper is that people may
still select an intent that could override, and generate good news about, the nature of those
drives. People presumably care about being the type who ￿misbehaves￿precisely because
society condemns such misbehavior. This is consistent with the Calvinist view that what
matters is one￿ s predestination status, and that human actions only count to the extent that
they convey information about that status.4
3This question has been studied by Prelec and Bodner (2003) and BØnabou and Tirole (2004), whose
work we discuss below.
4This does not imply that one could not endorse a more benign ethical view where what counts is not
4An example of actions being a⁄ected by forces outside of conscious designs is when the
ability to control a visceral impulse is diminished by a shock to external circumstances or
even to an internal organic disposition. This mechanism, though substantively di⁄erent,
works in a way that is similar to forgetfulness in BØnabou and Tirole (2004). In their
model, individuals forget their past actions with some probability and therefore learn from
outcomes, despite understanding that they had acted under an incentive to manipulate their
own beliefs. In our model, the imperfect free will associated with unconscious drives is the
condition for good behavior to improve self-image.
The model also characterizes conditions under which a stronger self-image (i.e., a higher
posterior on one having the good type) leads to a stronger disposition to select an intent
to resist, and hence to actually be more likely to resist temptation. The resulting pattern
is one where self-image is costly to improve (it requires forgoing temptations) but improve-
ments have lasting bene￿ts, so self-image works as a form of capital, which we call moral
capital. Under the individual￿ s optimal policy, morality emerges as a cumulative process of
habituation through action, which parallels Aristotle￿ s account of the attainment of virtue.
A number of recent papers o⁄er insights that help understand the shaping of moral
standards. Kaplow and Shavell (2007) focus on the relative convenience of investing in
instilling guilt and virtue versus using incentives to induce good behavior. Tabellini (2007)
studies investments in the transmission of cooperative values in an overlapping generations
framework. In a related model, Baron (2008) investigates di⁄erent social arrangements
for ensuring high levels of cooperation and compares the attractiveness of generalized vs.
restricted morality. These studies address important aspects of moral behavior, but abstract
from the internal process that makes individuals want to adhere to received moral objectives.
In all of these models adherence to values responds directly to a given investment in their
inculcation. Our model illustrates that although moral objectives might be internalized,
inculcation should also target the determinants of the degree of adherence to those objectives,
such as beliefs about one￿ s goodness and one￿ s ability to transform intent into actions.
Work on cognitive dissonance has emphasized the link between self-image and belief
manipulation. In this connection, Rabin (1994) relies explicitly on a link between self-
image and moral behavior, as do Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg (2003) in their model of
voluntary contributions, as well as Cervellati, Esteban and Kranich (2006) in their model
one￿ s type, which is after all a given, but one￿ s attempts at dealing with it, which are the result of a choice.
From a positive point of view, the model seeks to capture the regularity that people appear to value having
a ￿good nature.￿
5of moral sentiments and redistribution. The operationalization of self-image in those papers
is very di⁄erent from ours, which follows K‰ oszegi￿ s (2006) formulation of ego-utility in his
study of overcon￿dence and task choice. In his model, agents who are risk-averse about their
beliefs about their own ability will choose tasks that are less informative. The demand for
information about self also plays a crucial role in our model: when good behavior is relatively
uninformative about one￿ s type, risk-averse individuals will be willing to forgo temptations
in order to preserve their introspective reputation, causing self-restraint to emerge. Risk
aversion is necessary for individuals to be willing to sacri￿ce consumption for the sake of
self-esteem because, beliefs being a martingale, no individual would sacri￿ce consumption
for no expected improvement in her self-image.
Besides having a di⁄erent focus￿ K‰ oszegi is concerned with overcon￿dence and not moral
standards￿ a di⁄erence between our model and his is that in his setup individuals have un-
certainty about their ability, a trait which increases extrinsic payo⁄s, while in our setup
uncertainty relates to the moral type, a trait that decreases extrinsic payo⁄s. This di⁄erence
leads to divergences in results. For instance, in K‰ oszegi￿ s proposition 4, more con￿dence
on having the high type makes taking a risky action more likely, while in our setup more
con￿dence of having the good type leads to more resistance, which is akin to taking the less
risky action. That is, the correlation between con￿dence and the risk taken in our paper is
the opposite than in K‰ oszegi￿ s model.
One implication of the martingale property of beliefs is that when individuals￿priors
match objective probabilities they cannot a⁄ect their moral capital on average. Then wrong-
doing rates at the social level will depend on the dispersion of individual moral capital. This
resonates with the early ￿ndings by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) who study a model where
an individual manipulates her beliefs in order to prevent dynamically inconsistent behavior.
They note that beliefs cannot be manipulated in expectation, but higher moments can be.
In our paper, the individual wishes to manipulate her beliefs for purely intrinsic reasons.
The models by Prelec and Bodner (2003), BØnabou and Tirole (2006, 2007), and K‰ oszegi
(2006) can also be understood this way. Other work considers instrumental rationales for
manipulating beliefs. In Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and in BØnabou and Tirole (2004)
the individual manipulates her beliefs in order to help herself overcome time-inconsistency.5
5Beliefs are manipulated for instrumental reasons also in the model of Compte and Postlewaite (2004), in
which an individual wants to stay optimistic because such psychological state will improve her performance
at a given task. Hermalin and Isen (2008) o⁄er a model the where mood a⁄ects the choice of actions and
vice versa, leading to potential multiple equilibria in individual behavior.
6BØnabou and Tirole introduce several aspects that we revisit, such as self-reputation playing
a role, and past actions of the individual having the power to a⁄ect that reputation, thereby
opening the door to self-reinforcing patterns of behavior.6 But the setups have important
di⁄erences, notably that the individual in their model has time-inconsistent preferences, and
is modeled as a sequence of selves who play a noncooperative game (our setup is decision-
theoretic).7 In addition, unconscious forces play a central role in our model.
In this regard our model lies closer to Prelec and Bodner￿ s (2003) where the ￿ gut￿makes
decisions under the constraint that the conscious mind may disapprove of the gut￿ s ten-
dencies. They study a self-signaling game in which the gut makes a decision with an eye
to concealing its own nature as evidenced by the decisions made. In Prelec and Bodner￿ s
model the ￿ gut￿can be seen as a fully strategic player, while in our model unconscious forces
are just ￿ ￿ring away￿(like behavioral types in reputation models), and the individual, not
fully aware of their nature, may do well or badly at overriding them. We believe this is an
attractive modeling choice to capture unconscious impulses.
To summarize, most previous work contains one or more of the following traits: indi-
viduals have time-inconsistent preferences; the individual is conceptualized as a sequence of
di⁄erent selves who play a non-cooperative game amongst themselves; models are static or
have ￿nite horizons; unconscious bias, when modelled, acts as a strategic player. Our model
features an individual that contains a single self, uses Bayes￿rule to update beliefs, and has
time-consistent plans. The individual has an unconscious bias and a preference for feeling
con￿dent that such a bias is compatible with received morality. We characterize the full
dynamics of individual behavior over an in￿nite horizon. This is convenient for our analysis
of the accumulation of moral capital, as ￿nite horizon settings confound the e⁄ects of a state
variable that evolves over time (beliefs about self) with those of a terminal date.
3 The Model
The individual lives in an in￿nite horizon discrete time world and discounts the future by a
factor ￿ 2 (0;1). The individual is characterized by a type, good or bad, that is unknown to
her, and she is born with an initial belief that she is good with probability ￿0. She has two
6See also Tirole (1996) for a theory of corruption persistence based on the impact of stereotyping on
extrinsic incentives.
7Prelec and Bodner (2003), Brocas and Carrillo (2005) and Fudenberg and Levine (2006) also adopt a
non-cooperative approach to modeling intra-personal con￿ ict. The latter model can be expressed in decision-
theoretic terms, although it abstracts from self-image considerations.
7additively separable sources of utility: ￿self-esteem,￿which depends on her belief that she is
good, and consumption. What matters for our purposes is the additional consumption that
the individual could gain by dishonest means. We call this additional consumption utility a
￿temptation.￿
In each period t the individual faces a temptation xt, drawn randomly from nonnegative
numbers according to a distribution function F, with associated density f. We assume that
F is continuous, f (0) > 0, and Ex < 1. For concreteness, think of a bureaucrat facing an
opportunity for taking a bribe each period. The temptation is the additional consumption
utility obtained by consuming the bribe.
Given the lack of restrictions on the shape of F, we can assume without loss of generality
that utility is linear in x. To see what our reduced-form temptation x means, denote the
consumption utility function v(￿), the consumption available by honest means by ch, and the
additional consumption available by dishonest means by cw. Then x ￿ v (ch + cw) ￿ v (ch)
measures the additional utility from the bribe that is tempting the individual. For example,
a period when ch is lower￿ say because an in￿ ationary shock lowers real wages in the public
sector￿ results in a higher x due to concave v. A shift in the distribution F towards higher
values of x re￿ ects an environment where wrongdoing opportunities are relatively more
attractive.
An individual can take one of two actions in a given period: yield to the temptation or
resist. However, the individual cannot select her action directly, but rather can select her
intent. We will talk of ￿positive intent￿when the individual is actively attempting to resist
temptation, and of ￿no intent￿ or ￿giving up￿ when the individual is not trying. When
selecting a positive intent, a bad individual will in fact resist the temptation only if her free
will works in that period, which it does with probability ￿ 2 (0;1) (drawn independently
each period). When free will works then intent determines the action, and when free will
fails then the underlying type determines the action. This formulation separates an agent￿ s
intentions from her actions. One interpretation of imperfect free will is that an external
shock alters the ability of the individual to transform her intent into her action. Another
possibility is that of an internal shock, as humans have biological and subconscious impulses
that may thwart the designs of conscious thought. The role of imperfect free will in our
model is that actions may re￿ ect not just the agent￿ s intention, but also her type. As a
result, the agent may learn about her type by observing her own actions. Note that in a
world without free will there would be no choice. And in a world with perfect free will
(￿ = 1) it would be impossible to learn anything about one￿ s own type by looking at one￿ s
8own actions. When there are limitations on free will then self-discovery will have a role.
The individual can consciously perceive utility from temptations, and utility from self-
esteem. The individual with belief ￿t in period t enjoys a self-esteem u(￿t) during that
period. We assume that
u(￿) = ￿
1￿￿; (1)
where ￿ 2 [0;1) is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. Preferences over beliefs are not
standard in economics, but can be rationalized on the basis of psychological evidence that
people care about their own attributes for non-instrumental reasons ￿that is, for reasons
that are not connected to outcomes, but to the experience of living with a certain degree of
self-worth.
Conditional on t, individual beliefs can only take one of three values, ￿t = f0; ^ ￿t;1g. We
call individuals with a belief ^ ￿t 2 (0;1) unaware, while those who know their type for sure,
^ ￿t 2 f0;1g, are called aware. An unaware person who enters period t with beliefs ^ ￿t￿1 and
who successfully resists a temptation in period t will, applying Bayes￿rule, update her belief








: Thus, having been born with the initial belief ￿0; an
individual who has successfully resisted t times remains unaware and has the belief
^ ￿t =
￿0
￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿
t: (2)
The beliefs about one￿ s goodness improve when seeing oneself do good, even when knowing
that one has selected a positive intent. Note that, in any given period, the individual obtains
utility Ut = xt + u(0) = xt if taking the temptation, or Ut = u(￿t) if never having taken
one. Figure 1 shows the timeline in any given period t.
Our formulation of types and free will can be rationalized in an expanded setting following
Bernheim and Rangel (2004). They model individual actions as being automatically triggered
whenever a level of sensitivity to a cue surpasses some threshold level. Building on their
premise, now assume that the realized level of sensitivity at a point in time depends additively
on a baseline, permanent level, and a temporary sensitivity disturbance.8 Individuals di⁄er
in their baseline sensitivity. ￿Good types￿have a very low baseline sensitivity, while ￿bad
types￿have a very high baseline sensitivity. If the baseline sensitivity of good (bad) types
is low (high) enough relative to the extent of the support of temporary factors, we will
obtain good (bad) types that always (never) resist. The workings of a positive intent can
then be rationalized as raising the threshold for falling into temptation, so that bad types
8The additive formulation parallels the approach in Prelec and Bodner (2003).
9with favorable temporary shocks will get an overall realized sensitivity below the threshold
and resist. Then ￿ can be seen to capture the measure of temporary disturbances that,
under positive intent, would bring the realized sensitivity of bad types below the threshold.
This representation is clearly a simpli￿cation of the unconscious biological basis of behavior.
However, it is related to views in neuroendocrinology of how hormones may a⁄ect behavior
through an organizing and a situational impact (e.g., in connection with aggression and
sexual di⁄erentiation, see i.a. Hays 1981 and Sussman et al. 1987). The organizing e⁄ect
occurs before birth and in the ￿rst few years of life, shaping the central nervous system and
￿xing the baseline sensitivity. The situational impact is related to hormonal changes due to
circumstantial shifts, providing the changing disturbance that completes the determination
of realized sensitivity.
3.1 The individual￿ s objective
The problem of the agent is to select a policy ^ x1; ^ x2; ^ x3;::: to maximize expected lifetime
utility. The policy speci￿es cuto⁄values such that temptations above them will be met with
a positive intent to avoid them. For now we assume that the optimal policy will take such
a cuto⁄ form. We check later that this assumption is veri￿ed.
To set up the expected lifetime utility as a function of the cuto⁄s, it is useful to consider
￿rst the contribution of just one generic future period t, as perceived before the realization
of x1. (Later we combine these contributions into the present value of expected utility.) At
the end of period t the agent could be in four di⁄erent states in terms of the expected utility
contributed by period t: (i) she could remain unaware about her type, (ii) she could have
found out she has a good type, (iii) she could have found out in period t that she has the
bad type, (iv) she could have found in a period previous to t that she has the bad type. To
calculate the probability for each of the states we introduce the following
De￿nition 1 The term
Ht (^ x1;:::; ^ xt) ￿
t Y
s=1
F (^ xs); (3)
H0 ￿ 1;
denotes the probability that the agent has received shocks that she meets with positive intent
in all periods up to, and including, t.
An agent who is aware of being good will enjoy the self-esteem rewards of her certainty,
with value u(1). Someone who ends period t unaware of her type is someone who has
10not yet fallen for a temptation and who has beliefs ^ ￿t 2 (0;1) that she is good. Her
utility will be u(^ ￿t). Conditional on being good (which has prior probability ￿0), the two
relevant states have respective probabilities Pr(unawarej^ x1;:::; ^ xt) = Ht (^ x1;:::; ^ xt) and
Pr(awarej^ x1;:::; ^ xt) = 1￿Ht (^ x1;:::; ^ xt). Combining these probabilities with the respective
conditional utilities, the contribution to the expected utility of a good type from future period
t is,
EUtjgood = Ht (^ x1;:::; ^ xt)u(^ ￿t) + [1 ￿ Ht (^ x1;:::; ^ xt)]u(1):
Someone who had already learned that she has the bad type before period t will enter the
period with no self-esteem, u(0) = 0; and will take any temptation xt. Her expected utility
is just Ex. In the event that she ￿nds out in period t that she is bad she faces di⁄erent
expected utilities depending on more speci￿c circumstances. One possibility is that she
faces a temptation above her cuto⁄ ^ xt, does not attempt to resist, and sees herself seize
the temptation. This provides full evidence that she is bad, so u(0) = 0, and the expected
consumption utility conditional on this event is E[xjx ￿ ^ xt]. But it could also be that the
agent faces a temptation below ^ xt, selects a positive intent, but lacks free will. Her bad type
chooses the action for her, providing full evidence of being bad. Conditional on this instance
the expected utility is E[xjx < ^ xt]. Conditional on being bad, at the end of period t the
agent may remain unaware or be in one of the three awareness states just described. The
four possible awareness states have probabilities given by
Pr(unawarej^ x1;:::; ^ xt) = ￿
tHt (^ x1;:::; ^ xt);
Pr(aware beforej^ x1;:::; ^ xt) =
￿
1 ￿ ￿
t￿1Ht￿1 (^ x1;:::; ^ xt￿1)
￿
;
Pr(newly aware, high xj^ x1;:::; ^ xt) = ￿
t￿1Ht￿1 (^ x1;:::; ^ xt)[1 ￿ F (^ xt)];
Pr(newly aware, low xj^ x1;:::; ^ xt) = ￿
t￿1Ht￿1 (^ x1;:::; ^ xt)[F (^ xt)(1 ￿ ￿)]:
Combining these probabilities with the respective expected utilities (suppressing the argu-
ments of Ht for brevity) yields an expression for the expected utility accruing to a bad type











t￿1Ht￿1 (1 ￿ F (^ xt))E[xjx ￿ ^ xt] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
t￿1Ht￿1F (^ xt)E[xjx < ^ xt]
!
:
Because at the beginning of period 1 the agent attaches probability ￿0 to being good, her
expected utility from period t is
EUt = ￿0 [Htu(￿t) + (1 ￿ Ht)u(1)] + (1 ￿ ￿0)EUtjbad. (4)
11The sequence of utilities conditional on remaining unaware, u(^ ￿1);u(^ ￿2);:::; is just a known
increasing sequence of numbers that converges to u(1), hence we denote these numbers as
ut. Summing up and discounting the expected utilities (4) from all periods t = 1;2;::: gives
(after rearrangement) the individual objective function
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The problem of the individual is to select a sequence of cuto⁄s ^ x1; ^ x2;::: to maximize the
objective function (5). The cuto⁄ ^ xt gives the highest temptation that she will intend to
resist in period t conditional on remaining unaware as of the beginning of period t. (If she
is aware of her type in period t there is nothing to choose; good types are unable to do bad,
and bad types get zero utility from self-esteem so they take every temptation). The ￿rst
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where gs ￿ [￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿
s]us ￿ ￿0u(1).
This last expression (7) characterizes a sequence ^ x￿
1; ^ x￿
2;::: of solutions to the problem
where each threshold is a function of future (but not past) policies. (The optimal policy is
thus time-consistent). Note that Ht+s￿1=Hs = F (^ xs+1)￿￿￿￿￿F (^ xt+s￿1). Using the generic
expression for ^ x￿



























Remark 1 The structure of expected lifetime utility at any period t, conditional on being
unaware, is identical to the problem of a newborn individual, with the only di⁄erence that
12a newborn individual has prior belief ￿0 whereas an unaware individual has the belief ^ ￿t￿1.
Therefore ^ x￿
1 is identical to that of ^ x￿
s up to the time indices.
The problem of selecting the optimal policy from period 1 onwards is entirely analogous
to that of selecting a policy, while unaware of type, from some period t > 1 onwards. So
the problem of a person who is born with initial belief ￿0 is identical to the problem facing a
person who has, after t periods of successful resistance to temptations, obtained the updated
belief equal to ￿0.
The following proposition characterizes optimal individual behavior.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique solution to the agent￿ s maximization problem. If the
agent is risk averse in the utility over beliefs about herself (￿ > 0) then the solution is a
strictly positive and convergent sequence of cuto⁄s ^ x￿
1; ^ x￿
2;::: such that, while she remains
unaware of her type, she selects a positive intent to pass on every temptation xt such that
xt ￿ ^ x￿
t, and give up otherwise.
This result indicates that risk aversion is a necessary condition for self-restraint - the
intuition for this is explained in the next subsection. From now on we assume ￿ > 0. We
assumed that the optimal policy in each period would adopt the cuto⁄ structure. The fact
that the FOCs have a unique solution ^ x￿
s in each period and that the objective function is
concave in each cuto⁄ imply that the optimal policy has to adopt the cuto⁄ form. Because
the problem at hand is time-consistent, the cuto⁄s that the agent ￿plans￿for future periods
will still characterize her behavior if she were to reach those periods in a state of unawareness.
Note that we did not assume that larger temptations are harder to resist: The proba-
bility of intended resistance turning into actual resistance is independent of the size of the
temptation. The fact that individuals are more likely to resist small temptations is entirely
due to their optimization behavior.
3.3 Characteristics of individual behavior
3.3.1 The role of risk aversion
As just shown, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for wanting to resist temptations is to
be risk averse over self-image, or beliefs about one￿ s type. Let us go back to the behavior
that Weber associated with the Calvinist ethic. We mentioned earlier a problem with the
Weberian view. Why would one want to incur a cost in terms of forgone consumption
13in order to maintain any conviction one may have, when this conviction cannot change in
expectation? An attractive alternative could be to just ￿nd out the truth about one￿ s type
and then live accordingly. According to our model, individuals who ￿t the Weberian account
must dislike risk over their own beliefs about their salvation. The reason is that beliefs are
a martingale, which means that the agent cannot alter her beliefs in expectation. Why
would then she attempt to pass on a positive temptation? The intuition is that by intending
to resist individuals reduce the risk over their beliefs, which is valuable to a risk averse
individual. A similar logic arises in K‰ oszegi￿ s (2006) model of task choice.
A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the agent to be interested in attempting to resist
temptations is for her to have risk averse preferences over beliefs about her type. Let us
go back to the example of the behavior that Weber associated with the Calvinist ethic.
According to our model, individuals that behave in that way must dislike risk over their own
beliefs about their salvation. Why is risk aversion a requirement for such behavior? The
reason is related to beliefs being a martingale, which means that the agent cannot alter her
beliefs in expectation. Why would then she attempt to pass on a positive temptation? The
intuition is that by resisting individuals reduce the risk over their beliefs, which is valuable
to a risk averse individual. The appendix includes a formal explanation in the simple case of
an individual who lives for a single period. It is worth noting that the role of risk aversion
in creating endogenous self-restraint can be made in a static model. The dynamic model
is necessary to study the evolution of beliefs, and as discussed later, the in￿nite horizon is
important in order to abstract from terminal date e⁄ects.
Are people really risk averse regarding their beliefs? While we do not know of system-
atic evidence, the behavior of individuals facing a probable worrying medical diagnosis is
suggestive that risk aversion over beliefs may play a role in human behavior. Most indi-
viduals who have a parent with Huntington￿ s disease, and therefore a 50% probability of
having the disease themselves, prefer not to take the genetic test.9 If these individuals were
typical expected utility maximizers that only care about outcomes, they would want to ￿nd
out whether they have the disease, in order to make adjustments prior to the onset of this
incurable disease that sets in during middle age and is ultimately lethal. The fact that so
many refuse the test is suggestive of risk aversion over beliefs.
9￿Facing Life With a Lethal Gene.￿New York Times, March 17, 2007.
143.3.2 The role of imperfect free will
There is a second puzzling aspect to the Weberian account of the Calvinist ethic. It is not
obvious how one should interpret favorably any good acts that one has undertaken with the
known objective of producing favorable evidence of one￿ s own salvation. One possibility is
that individuals may forget why they took an action in the past, as highlighted by BØnabou
and Tirole (2004). But if an individual remembers her motivation to produce just that
evidence of salvation, she could attribute the good acts to these deliberate attempts, and
not to any underlying unknown type. Indeed, if intent always turns into action (￿ = 1)
individuals cannot learn about their type. As long as they always choose a positive intent,
they remain unaware and keep the prior belief ￿0.
However, choosing no intent induces a gamble that involves learning one￿ s type. A high
enough temptation can lure the agent to accept the gamble. She now faces an optimal
stopping problem in a stationary environment. As there is no growth in self-image, ^ x￿ is the
same in every period as long as the individual remains unaware. Therefore it is de￿ned by
a stationary version of (8), where ^ x￿
s = ^ x￿ for all s and gs = g = u(￿0) ￿ ￿0u(1) which is
















This ￿xed point equation de￿nes the optimal stationary cuto⁄. Note that the LHS is a 45-
degree line, while RHS begins at a positive value and grows towards a ￿nite limit. Therefore
there has to be at least one solution. This shows that, while risk aversion (which implies
g > 0) is necessary to have individuals pass on temptations, imperfect free will is not.
Imperfect free will is necessary for people to learn from past actions of resistance.
3.3.3 Endogenous moral standards, moral capital, and Aristotelian virtue
An important question is whether a person who begins by selecting a positive intent has
more or less of a reason to keep doing that as time goes by and she sees herself resist. In his
treatment of moral virtues in Nichomachean Ethics (see esp. Book II) Aristotle held that a
moral disposition is developed by the performance of moral acts. In his view, learning plays
a role in moral development, and the more a person behaves virtuously, the easier it gets to
continue to behave that way. Is this true of the individual in our model?
In our model, and individual who, having selected a positive intent at time t, resists,
will update her prior ^ ￿t￿1 to a higher level ^ ￿t. This makes the utility to be had in terms of
15self-esteem even higher, suggesting that higher beliefs over time should push the individual
to attempt to resist higher temptations. However, selecting a positive intent is counter-
productive in the event that one is truly good (a state that is now deemed more likely),
because the self-esteem return will be only u(^ ￿t) instead of u(1). To put it simply, the cost
of positive intent is a possible forgone temptation, and the bene￿t is a lower variance of
beliefs, but this variance goes to zero when self-image gets very high. As a result, it is not
obvious that individuals with higher self-image should have higher cuto⁄s. But we are able
to show,
Proposition 2 Individuals who are successful in resisting temptations become more predis-




Good actions bring stronger con￿dence of having the good type. This higher con￿dence,
which we call individual moral capital, in turn predisposes one to resist even larger tempta-
tions. The key to the proof is that although gains from reducing the variance of beliefs get
smaller as beliefs get close to certainty, the expected cost in terms of forgone consumption
goes to zero faster. To see that the latter costs must decrease, note that the agent￿ s intent
will get in the way of her enjoying a temptation in period t only if she is bad and has free
will in t. This event has a joint probability
￿
1 ￿ ^ ￿t￿1
￿
￿. Therefore, as beliefs ^ ￿t get close to
one the cost in terms of forgone temptations gets close to zero.
An important aspect of the last proposition is that the e⁄ective propensity of (bad)
individuals to submit to temptations is endogenous. In other words, we can interpret the
sequence of cuto⁄s ^ x￿
t as the individual￿ s moral standards, and we see that these standards
evolve over time, depending on the history of temptations, intent decisions, and actions.
Bad individuals who have always received temptations below their thresholds, and who have
always had free will, will become morally robust over time. However, their high standards
owe nothing to any underlying superiority in terms of ￿xed individual traits, and owe much
to having had a quiet life in terms of temptations and luck at having been in control of
their actions. Any bad type may suddenly lose her moral capital for two reasons: (i) having
selected a positive intent, she may lack free will and see herself take the temptation; (ii)
alternatively, she may receive a temptation above her current cuto⁄, and select no positive
intent, which will also trigger her taking the temptation. This will immediately take her
posterior to zero. After that, she will take every temptation coming to her because her
standards, as measured by cuto⁄s in the space of temptations, have dropped to zero.
163.3.4 Discussion on modelling features
Now that the basic characterization of individual behavior is complete, we make a few
remarks regarding our modelling approach.
In￿nite horizon
The point that risk averse individuals will resist some temptations can be made in sim-
pler ￿nite horizon settings. But investigating whether past good behavior has the e⁄ect of
strengthening moral dispositions requires our using an in￿nite horizon model. The reason
is as follows. An individual￿ s decision to resist a temptation takes into account the value
of the current temptation against the stream of self-esteem returns net of future expected
temptations. A shorter future diminishes that net value of future self-esteem returns. Thus,
the stream of payo⁄s associated with good behavior depends both on the state variable cap-
turing moral capital as well as on the remaining lifetime. Because individuals accumulate
moral capital over time, isolating the e⁄ects of moral capital in a ￿nite horizon model would
be di¢ cult, as these e⁄ects would be confounded with those of a shortening horizon. Indeed,
with a ￿nite horizon cuto⁄s eventually decrease even as beliefs continue to increase ￿the
policy function becomes non-monotonic due to a shortening of the horizon and not to any
other change in the connection between beliefs and incentives to resist. An in￿nite horizon
model o⁄ers a setting that is stationary up to the value of the state variable, and hence
allows us to isolate the e⁄ect of interest.
Dichotomous types
We assumed that good types always behave, while bad types may not, so types are very
di⁄erent. In a more general version of the model, one could imagine that both types may
misbehave, with good types having a lower chance of wrongdoing when deciding to resist.
In fact, the model we use is a limit case of a richer one where, in the absence of an active
intent to resist, good types behave with a probability ￿g while bad types resist with a lower
probability ￿b. When attempting to resist, both types will behave for sure if their free will
works, and only with their type-related chance if their free will fails. That is, good types will
behave with probability ￿g (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ while bad types behave with the lower probability
￿b (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿. This model would again imply that good behavior leads to a higher self-
image, while bad behavior leads to a lower self-image, although beliefs do not go down to
zero in the event of wrongdoing. Working out the full dynamics in this richer model is very
di¢ cult because the number of states explodes, while dynamic programming methods are
unable to deal with our model. This is due to the fact that the conditions usually invoked in
order to characterize policy functions when using dynamic programming are stronger than
17necessary and not met in our model.10 However, the basic facts of the static version of the
model with a single period can still be proved: a decision to resist yields a lower variance
gamble in terms of future beliefs and therefore risk averse individuals will choose to resist
temptations.
We have, however, simulated this richer model. According to our numerical results, even
if ￿b > 0 the policy function is monotonic and the results in the paper remain. If ￿g < 1
good types may at times err, so the policy function becomes eventually decreasing for high
enough beliefs. The reason is that for very high beliefs that one has the good type, a fall
is interpreted as a tremble from one￿ s type, rather than as evidence of having the bad type.
Therefore the dynamic path of the unaware contains a part where eventually the individual
becomes sanctimonious while lowering his own standards. In this version of the model the
results in the paper can be established as possibility results for a subset of initial priors.
Deciding to be bad
We assumed that free will only gets in the way when attempting to resist. In other words,
there is no symmetric decision to actively seek to commit a crime, decision which could be
thwarted by a lack of free will. We believe the version we have used better captures the
essence of wrongdoing: most of morality is de￿ned around trying to control impulses towards
self-serving goals. But a symmetric version of the model is possible, where imperfect free
will may cause an attempt to misbehave to fail. Our results go through in this formulation
provided one condition on parameter values is met. That condition ensures that selecting a
positive intent leads to a lower-variance gamble in terms of future beliefs about self.
3.3.5 Comparative statics
We now examine the role of the initial prior ￿0 and of the e⁄ectiveness of free will ￿ (note
￿ could just be a belief). We also analyze the role of a brighter future in the form of an
alternative distribution of temptations G that is ￿rst order stochastically dominated by F
(i.e., G tends to generate lower temptations than F). For example, G could capture a better
environment where the individual does not need bribes to live well. We then have
Proposition 3 The sequence ^ x￿
1; ^ x￿
2;::: is higher when
(a) temptations x are drawn from G rather than F, where G(x) > F (x) for all x.
10To prove monotonicity of the policy function through a dynamic programming approach we would have
to rely on results hinging on two su¢ cient conditions: that the per period expected payo⁄ function and the
transition function describing the probabilities over future beliefs be supermodular in xt and ^ ￿t. The ￿rst
condition can be met with a minimal change in the utility function we use. The second condition is violated.
18(b) the initial belief ￿0 is higher.
(c) the e⁄ectiveness of free will ￿ (or the belief in it) is higher (shown numerically under
exponential distribution of temptations).
(d) the discount factor ￿ is higher.
Proof. See Appendix.
Part (a) means that when the individual expects lower temptations in the future she will
choose more stringent moral standards today.
Part (b) means that an individual with higher initial beliefs will also choose more stringent
standards. This suggests that if parents desire that their o⁄spring resist temptations they
would want to inculcate in their o⁄spring a high belief in their own goodness.
Part (c) means that when individuals believe that they have more control over their ac-
tions they will choose more stringent standards. This result could only be shown numerically
for exponential distributions over temptations, and is far from obvious as there are forces
pushing in opposite ways. With stronger free will a positive intent is more likely to secure
a self-esteem gain but it is also more likely that it will preclude enjoying the temptation.
Moreover, a higher ￿ reduces the positive updating that takes place in case the temptation
is resisted.
These results imply that a better environment (in terms of higher ￿ and ￿, if we take the
beliefs to be rooted in the true values, and in terms of the distribution of temptations) reduce
the probability that the individual has done wrong by a given date due to two e⁄ects. Taking
the case of the distribution of temptations, the direct e⁄ect is that, given the individual￿ s
standards, a better environment makes it less likely that a high enough temptation will ma-
terialize so as to induce the individual to give up. The indirect e⁄ect is that the expectation
of a better environment leads the individual to resist even larger shocks, complementing the
direct e⁄ect. This positive feedback suggests that small di⁄erences in the environment could
generate relatively large departures in the propensity to do wrong.
Finally, part (d) states that when the individual cares more about the future she will
attempt to resist more temptations.
The results (c) and (d) match the emphasis by criminologists holding that the inability
to control impulses and to take the future into account play a role in the disposition toward
crime (see Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990, and Nagin and Paternoster 1993).
194 Moral capital and wrongdoing in a society
We now consider a society of individuals each facing the problem introduced in the previous
section. We assume that shocks are independent across individuals and that the society
is large in the sense that the law of large numbers can be used to derive the wrongdoing
rates in the society. We ￿rst analyze the evolution of the wrongdoing rate within a cohort
of individuals. Then we introduce an exogenous death rate in order to analyze wrongdoing
rates in a society that is in a demographic steady state.
Our analysis of individual behavior proceeded without specifying the actual probability
that an individual has a good type, because individual decisions depend only on subjective
probabilities. In what follows, the individual choice variables ^ xt should be interpreted as
having been optimized given beliefs ￿0 and ￿. While the individual intent to resist tempta-
tions depends on ^ xt, the ability to actually resist temptations conditional on intent depends
on whether one really is a good type and has free will. We denote the actual share of good
types by ￿ and assume that ￿ is a correct belief.
4.1 Wrongdoing rate within a cohort
Consider a cohort of individuals born into age t = 1 with initial belief ￿0 2 (0;1) that may or
may not be equal to ￿. The share of aware individuals￿ those with the belief ^ ￿t 2 f0;1g￿
increases over time, and a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the aware individuals will do wrong. We know
from Proposition 2 that as a cohort ages the resistance cuto⁄ ^ xt increases. The only ones to
resist temptations at age t are those who either have the good type, or those who, despite
being bad, end up the period continuing to be unaware of their type. Those who end age t
aware of being bad did wrong at age t. (This includes individuals who only became aware
during age t, i.e., after doing wrong for the ￿rst time). Thus the population wrongdoing rate
at age t is the probability that an individual has become aware of being bad by the end of
age t:
wt = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ Pr(unawarej^ x1;:::; ^ xt;bad)) (10)
= (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿
tHt (^ x1;:::; ^ xt)
￿
.
As the cohort ages, the term ￿
tHt (^ x1;:::; ^ xt) approaches zero and the wrongdoing rate wt
increases monotonically converging to the share of bad types 1 ￿ ￿. (All convergence in
this model is only asymptotic, in this case because ￿
tHt (^ x1;:::; ^ xt) is strictly positive for
any ￿nite t.) Resisting individuals must become less numerous because bad types eventually
20become aware ￿either because a very high temptation materializes, or because their free will
fails in some period.
The evolution of wrongdoing rates is linked to the evolution of the distribution of beliefs.
Notice ￿rst that, at age t, there are only three possible beliefs. The aware either know for
sure that they are bad or that they are good; the unaware have used the Bayesian updating
formula t times and so hold the same belief.
Type Belief ￿t Population share
Aware good 1 ￿[1 ￿ Ht (^ x1;:::; ^ xt)]
Aware bad 0 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿
tHt (^ x1;:::; ^ xt)
￿
Unaware ^ ￿t =
￿0
￿0+￿t(1￿￿0) ￿Ht (^ x1;:::; ^ xt) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
tHt (^ x1;:::; ^ xt)
The average belief at age t is therefore
￿ ￿t = ￿ + (￿0 ￿ ￿)Ht (^ x1;:::; ^ xt) (11)
Recall that H0 = 1 and Ht > Ht+1, so ￿ ￿0 = ￿0 and ￿ ￿t converges monotonically to ￿ as
t ! 1. If ￿0 > ￿ then the average belief in society converges to ￿ from above, while if
￿0 < ￿ then it converges to ￿ from below. The true distribution of types (and hence the
limiting distribution of beliefs) follows the Bernoulli distribution with success parameter ￿.
As the newborn have identical beliefs, the variance of their beliefs is zero, while the limiting
distribution has variance ￿(1 ￿ ￿). Gathering the above results we get
Proposition 4 As a cohort ages,
(a) the wrongdoing rate increases and converges to the share of bad types 1 ￿ ￿,
(b) the average belief converges monotonically to ￿, and
(c) the variance of beliefs increases and converges to ￿(1 ￿ ￿).
In particular, if initial beliefs are consistent with reality (￿0 = ￿) then the average belief
can never change. Regardless of how incorrect the initial beliefs may be, the wrongdoing
rate keeps increasing as beliefs become more polarized. The reason is simple: good types
do good regardless their awareness state, but bad types do wrong less often when unaware.
This proposition also implies that, if the initial prior is pessimistic (￿0 < ￿) then the average
self-image will improve (as ￿ ￿t increases towards ￿) while the wrongdoing rate increases.
4.2 Wrongdoing rate of a society in steady state
In this section we show that, in a world where people eventually die and are replaced by
births of new unaware individuals, two societies with the same share of bad types can have
21di⁄erent wrongdoing rates. Thus even long run corruption rates across countries do not
necessarily and exclusively re￿ ect ￿deep￿moral fundamentals captured by the share of bad
types.
Now interpret the parameter ￿not as a discount factor stemming from impatience but as
a constant survival probability facing each individual. Assume survival to be independent
of all other features in the model. This interpretation of ￿ is immaterial for the individual
decision and the wrongdoing rate within a cohort. Suppose also that a new cohort is born in
every period, and that the size of newborn cohorts is constant. These simplifying assumptions
allow for a tractable steady state analysis, as they mean that the size of every age group is
constant over time.
Denote the steady-state population share of age￿t individuals by zt. Entry and exit from
each age group must balance out (zt+1 = ￿zt, t = 1;2;:::), which requires the shares to be
zt = (1 ￿ ￿)￿
t￿1 for t = 1;2;:::. (12)





ztwt = (1 ￿ ￿)
(





tHt (^ x1;:::; ^ xt)
)
. (13)
The proportion of bad types gives the worst-case potential for the wrongdoing rate in society
so W must obviously be strictly below 1 ￿ ￿ since at least some bad types sometimes resist
temptations. But just how much short of 1￿￿ the steady state wrongdoing rate falls depends
on the parameters of the model.
Proposition 5 The steady state rate of wrongdoing in society W;
(a) is lower when the initial beliefs ￿0 of the newly born are higher,
(b) is lower when the distribution of temptations F is lower in the ￿rst order stochastic
dominance sense,
(c) is lower when the probability that free will works ￿ is higher (under exponential dis-
tributions of temptations).
Proof. Part (a) follows from Proposition 3(a); part (b) follows from Proposition 3(b);
part (c) follows from
dW
d￿















22where the sign follows from the fact that dHt=d￿ > 0 from proposition 3(c).
It is clear from (13) that a higher true share of good types results in a lower wrongdoing
rate. And it is also easy to see that regardless of the true population share of good types,
the social wrongdoing rate is lower whenever ￿0 and ￿ are higher (even if these are incorrect
beliefs), as well as when the distribution of temptations is lower. This follows from the results
in Proposition 3, showing that such parametric changes make individuals more resistant to
temptations. This suggests a useful social role for indoctrination in terms of inculcating
favorable beliefs. Anything that gives rise to a widespread overly optimistic perception ￿0
could historically have been a factor in the ￿natural selection￿between competing societies.
Note that the steady-state patterns of wrongdoing are not qualitatively di⁄erent even if the
existence of ￿good types￿is purely imaginary, i.e. if ￿ = 0.
4.3 Response to shocks: wrongdoing across societies
Let us consider how a society responds to aggregate shocks in the distribution of tempta-
tions. For example, a period with adverse macroeconomic conditions would likely expose
the population to higher temptations. Two otherwise similar societies who face di⁄erent
macroeconomic shocks may end up with di⁄erent wrongdoing rates.
The case of a cohort Consider ￿rst two identical cohorts in similar environments, one of
which encounters a temporary shock to its distribution of temptations. By shock we mean
that, for one period, individual temptations are drawn from some distribution G instead of
the usual F. Call the shock ￿bad￿if G stochastically dominates F (i.e., G(x) < F (x) for all
x > 0) and ￿good￿if the opposite is true. The shock comes as a surprise and is not expected
to be repeated, so individuals use ^ xt from Section 3 as their optimal policy. Suppose that
the shock takes place s periods after the birth of the cohorts. Obviously behavior before
period s is identical across the two cohorts.
Proposition 6 Of two otherwise similar cohorts, one that has encountered a bad (good)
shock in the past has a permanently higher (lower) wrongdoing rate. The di⁄erence in wrong-
doing rates converges to zero as the cohort becomes in￿nitely old.
Proof. Using the expression for wt in (10), and the de￿nition of Ht from (3) where G
replaces F at the time of the shock, the wrongdoing rate at ages t ￿ s for a cohort that
experienced the shock at age s ￿ 1 is
wt;s = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿





23Clearly wt;s > wt for all s ￿ t if G(^ xs) < F (^ xs), and vice versa if G(^ xs) > F (^ xs). As
t ! 1; ￿
tHt ! 0 so wt;s ! 1 ￿ ￿.
The wrongdoing rates of the shocked cohorts converge to 1￿￿ just as they do for a cohort
that was not shocked, so eventually the e⁄ects of the shock wash out. Nevertheless, history
matters, as wrongdoing rates are determined by a process that has memory. Bad shocks
that prompted a higher share of people to give in to temptations in one period accelerate the
polarization of beliefs and yield higher wrongdoing rates for every subsequent period. This
underscores that moral capital at the level of society is not just about the average belief of
individuals. It depends also on how beliefs are distributed across individuals.
The case of a society in demographic steady state Now consider a whole society that
faces the shock G in some period; call that period zero without loss of generality. We are
interested in the level of wrongdoing in society s periods after the shock. At that point all
cohorts born less than s periods ago are not a⁄ected by the shock so their wrongdoing rate
is given by (10), while those that were born during or before the shock have the wrongdoing
rate given by (14). Combining the cohort wrongdoing rates with the population shares (12),
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(

















t=1termt ￿ 0 for convenience to cover the case s = 0. The direction of
the shock depends on the ratios G(^ xt)=F (^ xt) in the natural way. Clearly the wrongdoing
rate must eventually return to the steady state value, as ever fewer survivors remain from
the shocked period.
Proposition 7 Of two otherwise similar societies, one that has encountered a bad (good)
shock in the past has a permanently higher (lower) wrongdoing rate. The di⁄erence in wrong-
doing rates converges asymptotically to zero over time.
Proof. The di⁄erence of the wrongdoing rates in (15) and (13) is the deviation of
society￿ s wrongdoing rate from steady state s periods after the shock:












24This is positive if the shock is bad (i.e., if G(x) < F (x)), and negative if the shock is good.
As s ! 1, the terms ￿
s￿1￿
sHs (^ x1;:::; ^ xs) converge to zero.
If the shock is bad (i.e., G(^ x) < F (^ x) for all ^ x) then the deviation from steady state
Ws￿W is positive. History matters through its impact on the stock of unaware individuals.
Bad shocks accelerate learning, lower that stock, and augment wrongdoing. Tirole (1996)
o⁄ers a model of corruption persistence based of stereotyping, where the extrinsic marginal
cost of corruption to individuals (namely the marginal impact on the probability of getting
caught) is assumed to be decreasing under repeated acts of corruption. His model generates
a form of strong persistence of corruption in the form of multiple steady states. In our model
self-reinforcing e⁄ects are permanent at the individual level and arbitrarily long lasting, but
not eternal, at the social level. The e⁄ects of any shock will die out asymptotically because
those who experience the shock eventually die and are replaced by new cohorts who did not
experience the shock.
5 Applications
5.1 Enhanced punishment for repeat o⁄enders
In this subsection we consider a planner who is interested in minimizing wrongdoing and
who can o⁄er incentives to agents. For concreteness, we will focus on punishments for bad
behavior and assume the planner can detect bad behavior with some exogenous probability.
The margin we investigate here is whether punishment should change with o⁄ense history.
In order to isolate the e⁄ect of interest we impose the following simpli￿cations. The planner
knows past behavior by all agents in a single cohort and has a one-time capability to impose
punishment on those who do wrong in the current period. Denote with Na and Nu the
expected punishment to be imposed respectively on the aware and the unaware that do
wrong. (In other words, Na and Nu incorporate the probability of detection.) The net
expected return from seizing a temptation x is therefore x ￿ Na for the aware and x ￿ Nu
for the unaware.
A planner who wants to minimize wrongdoing would have an easy task if punishment were
costless. So we assume that expected punishments are costly to the planner, as captured by
an increasing and convex function c(Na + Nu). This cost formulation captures a world where
threatening with more likely and intense punishment is costly because it requires stronger
25detection and punishment capabilities.11 Lastly, we assume that the planner discounts the
future according to the factor ￿ < 1, while individuals have a survival rate ￿ and do not
further discount time. Also, in order to guarantee the satisfaction of the second order
conditions in the planner￿ s problem, we assume that larger temptations are less common
than small ones, i.e., that f (x) is decreasing.12
To construct the objective of the planner, we ￿rst characterize the impact of punishment
on wrongdoing. Because those who are good never do wrong, it is su¢ cient to concentrate
on the behavior of the bad types; we normalize their mass to 1. We know from previous
sections that, absent punishment, those who are bad and aware of it do wrong for sure.
But threatened with a punishment Na they would attempt to resist whenever the realized
temptation satis￿es x < Na. Therefore, given a punishment Na, the rate of wrongdoing
among the aware will be 1 ￿ ￿F (Na). That means the punishment on the aware obtains a
reduction in wrongdoing of exactly ￿F (Na) in the current period. As the punishment is for
the current period only, and the aware learn nothing regardless of their action, Na has no
further impact on wrongdoing.
The impact of current period punishment on wrongdoing by the unaware is more complex
and is captured in the following,
Lemma 1 A one time punishment Nu attains a reduction in the expected wrongdoing of







The proof shows that under punishment Nu the current period cuto⁄ satis￿es ^ x
p
1 = ^ x1 +
Nu, so current punishment raises the current optimal cuto⁄of the unaware one for one. Thus
punishment achieves a reduction in current wrongdoing equal to ￿(F (^ x1 + Nu) ￿ F (^ x1)).
But because punishment complements the e⁄ects of moral capital it raises the share of
unaware individuals who resist and remain unaware, leading to lower wrongdoing in fu-
ture periods. Speci￿cally, of those who are saved from temptation in the current period,
11Costs may also increase with the number of people who do wrong and who must eventually be punished.
We abstract from this possibility which would introduce a form of increasing returns to punishment, as larger
punishments could pay for themselves through a lower number of inmates. Our results in this subsection are
robust in the face of those e⁄ects if we impose a technical condition on the distribution of temptations to
ensure that overall punishment costs continue to be convex.
12This assumption is not strictly necessary. But as is well known, when densities of arbitrary shape are
involved in an optimization problem second order conditions may not be satis￿ed. So assuming a monotonic
density simpli￿es matters, and within this class a decreasing density becomes necessary to make sure that
the second order conditions are satis￿ed.
26￿￿F (^ x2) are saved again in period 2, and (￿￿)
2 F (^ x2)F (^ x3) are saved in period three,





1 + ￿￿￿F (^ x2) + (￿￿)
2 ￿
2F (^ x2)F (^ x3) + ::: captures the present and future (discounted) re-
ductions in wrongdoing. All future cuto⁄s are unchanged.
Social planner￿ s problem
Using lemma (1), the planner￿ s objective is to maximize,
￿F (Na) + ￿[F (^ xt + Nu) ￿ F (^ xt)]Zt ￿ c(Na + Nu) (17)









which only contains future cuto⁄s and does not involve ^ x
p
1. Given this program, and our
stated assumptions, we obtain,
Proposition 8 If the planner￿ s patience or the agents￿survival rate are low enough, then
the planner imposes harsher punishment on repeat o⁄enders relative to ￿rst-time wrongdoers.
Formally, if ￿ or ￿ are low enough, then Na > Nu.
Proof. See Appendix.
An intrinsic disposition to resist temptations allows individuals to behave honestly even
when there are no extrinsic incentives in place. And extrinsic incentives can obviously help to
keep individuals behaving honestly. Proposition 8 in this appendix tells us that the design of
extrinsic incentives should re￿ ect the strength of intrinsic dispositions to avoid wrongdoing.
In this extension of our model, a planner spends less resources trying to deter agents that
already have intrinsic self-deterrent motives, and chooses to punish more harshly those who
have lost their moral capital and are willing to take any temptation that comes their way.
This design resembles the very common penal pro￿le of heavier sentences on wrongdoers
with a criminal record, and rules such as the ￿three strikes and you are out￿that apply in
many US states. Notably, in California there is a second strike provision according to which
a second felony triggers a sentence twice as heavy (Clark, Austin, and Henry 1997). Note
however that our last proposition does not support those institutions in an unconditional
way. The planner should be su¢ ciently impatient, or agents die fast enough, so as to forgo
an added bene￿t of imposing punishment on those who still have their moral capital. That
27added bene￿t is the wider preservation of intrinsic incentives, which will lower wrongdoing
in future periods.
This result carries over to the case where punishments are permanent. To see why, note
￿rst that future punishments make no di⁄erence to the decision of an aware person. Note next
that higher permanent punishments Na in the future would increase ^ xt today by making the
life of wrongdoing less attractive (recall Proposition 3.a in the paper). This would further
decrease the marginal deterrence value of Nu today by pushing the range of temptations
where the punishment can a⁄ect individual behavior by the unaware even further to the tail
of the distribution. This would reinforce the planner￿ s incentives to increase the punishment
on the aware.
This result shows that the design of extrinsic incentives should re￿ ect the strength of
intrinsic dispositions to avoid wrongdoing. Harsher punishment for repeat o⁄enders can
arise also in contexts of pure extrinsic deterrence.13 Our point was not to characterize
optimal deterrence in all generality, but to show that optimal extrinsic incentive schemes are
a⁄ected by taking into account the endogeneity of moral standards.
5.2 Moral taboos and rituals
Moral taboos and rituals are sometimes sanctioned by religions or cultural norms and typ-
ically stipulate prohibitions to engage in certain acts. Very often, the taboos are against
acts that convey satisfaction without imposing any obvious harm, such as eating and drink-
ing certain things. For our purposes, a ￿taboo￿can also be against deviations from some
proscribed but avoidable inconvenience or ￿ritual￿ , such as costly religious ceremonies, or
other mandated behavior that deducts from otherwise available consumption utility. Here
we analyze a rationale for such taboos.14
Suppose that individuals live for a period before they enter society and face the temp-
tations we have considered so far. Before the initial period individuals have the possibility
to consume a good (tea, say) that yields positive utility. Consider a tradition stipulating
13Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) and Polinsky and Shavell (1998) analyze conditions under which optimal
￿nes may be higher for repeat o⁄enders. In the ￿rst paper o⁄ense history tracks o⁄ense propensity. In
the second it is shown that harsher punishment for repeat o⁄enders may increase deterrence of ￿rst time
o⁄enders.
14For a di⁄erent conception of taboos, see Fiske and Tetlock (1997), and Benabou and Tirole (2007). In
the latter, the agent may decide to avoid information about the price of a ￿taboo￿transaction, as part of a
self-control strategy. See also the study of moral placebos in Prelec and Bodner (2003).
28that consuming tea amounts to falling for a temptation. Now suppose that, as in our model,
individuals who partake in the tradition consider such fall to reveal a bad type.
The size of the taboo temptation does not matter as long as individuals will attempt to
resist it, so suppose the taboo is a temptation of size x < ^ x1. Compared to a world without
the taboo, the immediate bene￿t is that those who successfully resist the taboo will enter
their ￿rst period with a resistance threshold ^ x2 instead of ^ x1. So, of all those bad types
who had free will when facing the taboo (a fraction ￿), a fraction 1 ￿ ￿F (^ x2) will engage
in wrongdoing in period 1 instead of a higher fraction 1 ￿ ￿F (^ x1) which would engage in
wrongdoing without the taboo (i.e., in a situation where consuming tea is not thought to
convey information on one￿ s type). The cost is that share 1￿￿ of individuals will fall to the
temptation even before their ￿rst period because their free will fails them. Therefore, the
gain from the taboo in terms of reduced wrongdoing in period 1 is,
1 ￿ ￿F (^ x1) ￿ [￿(1 ￿ ￿F (^ x2)) + (1 ￿ ￿)] > 0;
which is positive whenever ￿F (^ x2) > F (^ x1). The gain is increasing in the probability that
a shock falls in between the original and the improved threshold. For the taboo to decrease
wrongdoing the increase has to be su¢ ciently high to compensate for those who fall to the
taboo temptation due to the failure of free will.
The taboo has a lasting impact on wrongdoing rates since survivors will carry with them
a higher ^ xt in every subsequent period than what they would have had without the taboo.
(Eventually this advantage fades away as ^ xt converges to its limiting value.) Assuming,
for simplicity, that the breaking of the taboo does not count as actual wrongdoing, the
wrongdoing rate of a cohort of age t that faced the taboo is
w
0
t = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿





The impact of the taboo on steady-state wrongdoing in the society is,
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0











Ht (^ x1;:::; ^ xt). (20)
The taboo will lower the steady-state rate of wrongdoing in society when (20) is negative.
Note that the choice of o⁄ering the taboo before the ￿rst period was mostly a normalization
for the age index. A similar analysis would apply to an older cohort who could be exposed
to a taboo in between ages ￿ ￿1 and ￿, but with the above summation beginning at t = ￿.15
15Unadjusted, this formula would then mean that the arti￿cial taboo period in the middle of the lifespan
also comes with a risk of non-survival, and that the taboo was unanticipated by the individual.
295.3 Moral capital and career choice
How do individuals select into careers in an economy where individual beliefs vary and dif-
ferent careers o⁄er di⁄erent distributions of temptations? For concreteness, consider two
occupations where one has a higher distribution of temptations, in the sense of ￿rst-order
stochastic dominance. For example, one could consider politics as a high temptation activ-
ity and academia as a low temptation activity. The population consists of a continuum of
individuals with heterogeneous initial beliefs ￿ 2 [0;1]. We want to know how individuals
self-select into di⁄erent occupations depending on ￿. We assume that the economy has a
need for workers in both careers, hence compensation may have to adjust so that each career
is preferred by some types. The mechanism of this adjustment is immaterial for our exer-
cise; what is important is that in equilibrium individuals who require a lower compensating
di⁄erential will self-select to the low-temptation career.
To make things simple, suppose individuals live for only one period. We then have
Proposition 9 Consider an economy where individuals di⁄er by initial self-image, and
where two occupations o⁄er di⁄erent distributions of temptations, with one ￿rst-order sto-
chastically dominant. In equilibrium, individuals with self-image above (below) an equilibrium
cut-o⁄ enter the occupation with lower (higher) temptations.
Proof. See Appendix.
For aware types the selection incentives are clear: An individual with ￿ = 1 will be
indi⁄erent between the two careers, and will prefer the low-temptation career under any
positive compensating di⁄erential favoring that career. An individual with ￿ = 0 only cares
about temptations and will choose the high-temptation activity unless there is a fairly large
compensating di⁄erential in favor of the low-temptation activity. In between, the result is not
obvious, because the unaware types have an incentive to protect their self-image by choosing
a low-temptation activity. Low self-image individuals, judging themselves vulnerable, could
be interested in protecting whatever little self-esteem they have by choosing a low temptation
activity. As it turns out, the population can always be divided into just two segments by
their beliefs ￿ so that types in the lower segment of self-beliefs will enter the high-temptation
professions.
Are politicians more corrupt than academicians because they are inherently less moral or
because they have more opportunities for corrupt behavior? In our model both arguments
are correct. Even if people were divided randomly between occupations, the higher temp-
tations would cause there to be more wrongdoing in the high-temptation sector, because
30the opportunity cost of attempting to preserve a positive self-image is higher. However, the
higher rate of wrongdoing in the high-temptation sector is further reinforced by the selection
of types.
6 Conclusion
We propose a model of endogenous moral standards rooted in two ideas: that actions depend
partly on unconscious drives and that people prefer to think they have the good type,
i.e., that their unconscious drives are geared towards received morality. We characterize
conditions under which self-restraint will emerge endogenously in the form of passing on
enjoyable temptations for the sake of keeping a good introspective reputation. We also
identify conditions for self-reinforcing patterns of virtue and corruption to emerge.
When intent does not fully determine actions, a history of resistance improves self-image
and increases the disposition to resist temptations, yielding a view of morality as a cumulative
process of habituation through action. This view of morality parallels Aristotle￿ s account
of the development of virtue. We view the improvement of the individual￿ s self-image as
a process of moral capital formation. When individuals perform actions that damage their
self-image, durable damage is also done to their ability to resist such actions in the future,
creating hysteresis in wrongdoing at the individual level.
Stronger initial beliefs about having a good type, lower expected temptations, a lower
discount rate, and stronger con￿dence in one￿ s ability to transform intentions into actions
induce more stringent moral standards. At the social level, the wrongdoing rate is determined
not just by the average self-image but more generally by its distribution across individuals.
Societies with the same distribution of types but who have faced less fortunate histories
involving larger temptation shocks will have to endure a more polarized distribution of
individual self-images. This polarization will cause more wrongdoing even if the average
self-image is the same across societies. Therefore, cross-country measures of wrongdoing and
cultures of corruption may not re￿ ect di⁄erences in deep moral fundamentals but simply
di⁄erent histories.
Our model o⁄ers some detail about the workings of identity (see also BØnabou and Tirole
2004). Akerlof and Kranton (2000) posit that identity a⁄ects behavior because it poses costs
to an individual doing things that are deemed inappropriate for people with a given identity.
Our model suggests that ￿identity-based costs￿may not be constant, but respond to past
actions and to the person￿ s beliefs that such identity (e.g., that of a good person) is still
31hers. The model can also rationalize taboos, why high temptation activities may attract
the individuals least equipped to resist, thus magnifying wrongdoing di⁄erentials across
activities, and a rationale for punishing repeat-o⁄enders more harshly. This application
illustrates that the optimal design of deterrence schemes may change when the disposition
toward wrongdoing is endogenized.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove a series of lemmas (2, 3 and 4), that jointly yield
Proposition 1. The ￿rst lemma shows that optimal behavior is attached to a single sequence
of cuto⁄s, the second one says that the ￿rst order conditions of the individual￿ s problem
identify the optimal cuto⁄ sequence, and the third lemma says cuto⁄s will be positive i⁄
￿ > 0.
Lemma 2 There is a unique sequence ^ x￿
1; ^ x￿
2; ^ x￿
3;:: characterizing optimal behavior.
Proof of Lemma 2: From inspection of (7), each cuto⁄ is uniquely determined as a
sum of two terms: the ￿rst one captures the trade-o⁄ in the contemporary period (
gs
(1￿￿0)￿s)








t R ^ xt+s
0 xf(x)dx
o
equals Vs minus a constant). Then the
uniqueness of an optimal sequence characterized by (6) follows. To see this, suppose not.
Then starting in some period s ￿ 1 there is a number of periods where there is more than one
cuto⁄ forming part of a sequence satisfying the FOCs. Then all the optimal subsequences
starting in period s + 1 must yield the same continuation value. If not, following s the
agent would choose the one subsequence yielding the highest expected payo⁄. But if all
subsequences starting in s+1 yield the same continuation value, then there cannot be more
than one cuto⁄ in period s, because the FOC at s determines ^ xs uniquely as a function of
the continuation value at s + 1 and the term
gs
(1￿￿0)￿s.￿
One implication of this lemma is that the e⁄ects of changes in future thresholds (around
the latter￿ s optimal value) on the objective function cancel out and do not a⁄ect the optimal
value of earlier thresholds.
Lemma 3 A sequence ^ x￿
1; ^ x￿
2; ^ x￿
3;::: satisfying the FOCs is a global maximizer of V0.
Proof of Lemma 3: First we show that a sequence f^ x￿
ig
1
i=1 satisfying the FOCs consti-
tutes a maximum. Later we show it is the only one.
32Because the cross partial of V0 with respect to any two cuto⁄s ^ xs; ^ xt is zero (this can be
shown through tedious but straightforward computation of the cross-partial), concavity of
the objective function around each cuto⁄is su¢ cient for a maximum. Wlog we focus on the
FOC for ^ x1,
@V0
@^ x1
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Inspection reveals that V0 (^ x￿
1; ^ x￿
2;:::) is concave in ^ x1. First, f (^ x1) > 0. Second, the large
product involving 1
F(^ x1) is independent of ^ x1 (cancel 1
F(^ x1) out with the factor F (^ x1) inside
Ht). Then, at the optimum, any reduction in ^ x1 below ^ x￿
1 would make fu1 [￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿]￿
￿0u(1)￿(1 ￿ ￿0)￿^ x1g larger, making the entire left hand side of the FOC positive. A similar
argument shows the entire LHS of the FOC would be negative for any ^ x1 > ^ x￿
1.
To show that the sequence f^ xig
1
i=1 constitutes a global maximum, note that this sequence
is the unique interior extremum. So we just need to make sure it yields higher expected utility
than some sequence where one or more thresholds take extreme values. Because the cross
partials on cuto⁄s are zero, we can consider deviations in one threshold at a time. Can
the agent gain by setting one threshold to the min in the support of x (or, analogously,
by increasing the threshold without bound)? Suppose she can. Then the objective function
attains another maximum at ^ xs = 0. Because the objective function is increasing for ^ xs below
but close to ^ x￿
s and is continuously di⁄erentiable, the objective function must have a minimum
somewhere in (0; ^ x￿
s), a contradiction. A similar contradiction arises when considering the
possibility of increasing ^ x￿
s without bound.￿
Lemma 4 A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the sequence ^ x￿
1; ^ x￿
2; ^ x￿
3;::: to be strictly
positive and to converge asymptotically to a ￿nite strictly positive limiting value is that ￿ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4: We show ￿rst that the sequence f^ xtg
1
t=1 is positive i⁄￿ > 0. From
Remark 1 all cuto⁄s are analogous up to ￿t. Thus, with no loss of generality, we focus now
on showing that ^ x1 > 0 i⁄ ￿ > 0. Recall that the solution for ^ x￿
1 is given by (8), which
involves a lengthy second term that is the value of the objective function as of period 2
(up for the constant
￿0u(1)+(1￿￿0)Ex
1￿￿ which does not depend on any choice variable). That
expression must must be nonnegative because by inspection it is clear one can always attain
zero by setting all future thresholds to be zero. Therefore, it is su¢ cient that g1 > 0 to get
33^ x￿
1 > 0. Note that g1 (￿0) > 0 means that,
u(￿1)[￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿] ￿ ￿0u(1) > 0 , (22)
￿
￿0
￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿
￿1￿￿









which is met if and only if ￿ > 0. This does not show necessity, because the second term
in ^ x￿
1 may be positive, so in principle ^ x￿
1 could be positive even if
g1
(1￿￿0)￿ is not. But note
that for the second term of ^ x￿
1 to be positive it must have some positive terms
gt+1
(1￿￿0)￿. These
have the same structure as
g1
(1￿￿0)￿, and also require ￿ > 0 to be positive. If the second term
of ^ x￿
1 is not positive then it is zero, and ￿ > 0 becomes necessary for g1 > 0.
To show that f^ x￿
ig
1
i=1 converges to a positive limit whenever ￿ > 0 we need to show
two things: ￿rst, if f^ x￿
ig
1
i=1 converges it does it to a unique ￿nite limit, and second, that it
really does converge. Note that as ￿ converges to unity the problem becomes stationary, so
^ x￿ should also be constant for all future periods. The limiting value of ^ x￿ must satisfy the
following ￿xed point equation:
^ x












where E[xjx ￿ ^ x￿] = 1
F(^ x￿)
R ^ x￿








functional form of the utility function (as long as it is concave) a⁄ects ^ x￿ only via Gt:
Because u(￿) = ￿1￿￿, we have lim￿￿!1 Gt = ￿￿
t￿1. We can simplify, from (24), the







tE[xjx ￿ ^ x￿]
￿
. This can be
written as ^ x￿ ￿￿ = ￿￿F (^ x￿)E[^ x￿ ￿xjx ￿ ^ x￿]. Note the right hand side of the last equation
is nonnegative. Therefore, the left hand side yields ^ x￿ ￿ ￿ > 0 leaving ^ x￿ > 0. To see that
this limit value ^ x￿ exists, is positive for all ￿ > 0, and is unique, note that the left hand side
in the last equality has slope equal to one, and the right hand side has slope ￿￿F (^ x￿) < 1;
hence the limit value for f^ x￿
ig
1
i=1 exists and is unique. To see it converges, note that the
sequence is bounded. This is clear from the fact that the continuation value is bounded for
all t. Because the sequence is bounded, it has a convergent subsequence. Besides, because
^ x￿ is unique, every convergent subsequence converges to that point, and then the sequence
converges to its unique limit value.￿
Proof of Proposition 2: Note ￿rst that the resolution of the problem of determining
the optimal sequence f^ x￿
ig
1
i=s is the same as solving for the sequence f^ x￿
ig
1
i=1 up to the fact
that one￿ s beliefs will be higher in period s than they are in period 1. Therefore, we just
need to show that ^ x￿
1 is increasing in the initial beliefs ￿0. As @2V0=@^ x￿
1@^ x￿
t = 0, we are only
34interested in
d^ x1
d￿0 as given by the direct e⁄ects, plus the indirect e⁄ect that ￿0 has through



























so we just need to show that
gt(￿0)




























The ￿rst term can be shown to equal
ut[￿0+(1￿￿0)￿t￿￿￿t]￿u(1)
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￿ ￿0u(1)
￿0 (1 ￿ ￿0)
2 ￿
: (28)







￿0+(1￿￿0)(1￿￿)￿t. Tedious algebra shows that,
￿
￿0




￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)￿
; ￿ 2 (0;1);￿ 2 (0;1);￿0 2 (0;1); (29)
which implies the previous inequality.￿
Proof of Proposition 3: (a) Follows from Remark 1 and the proof of Proposition 2.
(b) Again we can ignore indirect e⁄ects and compute only the partial derivative due to
@2V0=@^ x￿
1@^ x￿
t = 0. Wlog we focus on ^ x1, and compare its optimal value when the temptation
















































































35Note that ^ x1 (F) is the same expression, only we should write F wherever we wrote G in
the last expression. Then we can compute,
^ x
￿

























































Note if a future threshold ^ xt is set to a positive value, it is because doing so must yield a
positive payo⁄, which implies that all the terms in the summation inside ^ x1 are nonnegative.
This, together with Gk > Fk implies that the last expression is positive.
c) This result is surprisingly hard to prove analytically. We have solved the model nu-
merically covering the whole parameter space using exponential distributions for temptations
and shown that the sequence of cuto⁄s increases in ￿. These solutions are available upon
request.
d) It is straightforward to show that V0 is supermodular on (^ xs;￿).￿
Proof of Lemma 1: The unaware person facing punishment Nu (note the unaware
person does not care about Na because punishment only occurs in the current period) is to
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= f (^ x1)fu1 [￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿] ￿ ￿0g ￿ (34)

























































































tells us that ^ x
￿p
1 = ^ x1+Nu, implying that punishment Nu achieves a reduction in wrongdoing
equal to ￿(F (^ x1 + Nu) ￿ F (^ x1)) because current punishment raises the optimal cuto⁄of the
unaware one for one in period 1. The cuto⁄solutions in equation (7) tell us that the cuto⁄s for
all periods following the ￿rst depend on the static payo⁄s in each respective period, and on the
continuation payo⁄s that depend on yet future cuto⁄s. Because punishment applies only to




3;:::g are just like in the original problem. This does not
mean however that one time punishment does not a⁄ect wrongdoing in future periods. But it
does mean that the only e⁄ect that current punishment has on future wrongdoing is through
its impact on the share of unaware individuals who resist and enter the future unaware.
Speci￿cally, of those who are saved from temptation in the current period, ￿￿F (^ x2) are
saved again in period 2, so ￿￿F (^ x2) is the reduction of wrongdoing in period 2 as a result of
punishment Nu having been present in period 1. Next, (￿￿)
2 F (^ x2)F (^ x3) are saved in period
three, and so on. As a result, the one time punishment Nu leads to an expected wrongdoing
reduction equal to ￿(F (^ x1 + Nu) ￿ F (^ x1))
￿
1 + ￿￿F (^ x2) + (￿￿)
2 F (^ x2)F (^ x3) + :::
￿
. And
because the planner discounts future reductions in crime according to the factor ￿, we obtain
the expression in the lemma.￿
Proof of Proposition 8: The ￿rst-order conditions for Na and Nu are,
￿f (Na) ￿ c
0 (Na + Nu) = 0; (39)
￿f (^ xt + Nu)Zt ￿ c
0 (Na + Nu) = 0: (40)
Solving for c0 (Na + Nu) and combining yields f (Na) = f (^ xt + Nu)Zt. Note from (18) that
Zt approaches 1 as ￿ or ￿ approach zero. Recall that ^ x1 > 0. Therefore, in the neighborhood
of Zt = 1, f (^ x + Nu) is arbitrarily close to f (Na), which yields Nu ’ Na ￿ ^ xt and hence
Nu < Na.
37The second order conditions are,
H11 = f
0 (Na) ￿ c
00 (Na + Nu) < 0;
H22 = f
0 (Nu + ^ xt) ￿ c
00 (Na + Nu) < 0;
jHj = H11H22 ￿ H12H21 =
= (f
0 (x) ￿ c
00)(f




0 (y + k) ￿ c
00f
0 (x) ￿ c
00f
0 (y + k) > 0:
The convexity of costs and the assumption f0 (x) < 0 guarantee that these expressions are
satis￿ed.￿
Proof of Proposition 9: Using expression (8), the CRRA utility function, and con-








^ ￿1 ￿ 1
￿
. We now drop the star from the notation, so that ^ x stands for
the optimal cut-o⁄. Notice that ^ x is increasing in ￿ and ￿ but independent of ￿, and that
lim￿!1 ^ x(￿) = ￿.
The expected utility of an individual with belief ￿ going to a profession with mean
temptation ￿ is
V (￿;￿) = F (^ xj￿)([￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]u(^ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)E[xjx < ^ x;￿])
+(1 ￿ F (^ xj￿))(￿u(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)E[xjx ￿ ^ x;￿])





















The distribution with higher temptations is de￿ned in terms of ￿rst order stochastic
dominance, so F￿ (xj￿) < 0. Recall that ^ x is independent of ￿. Denote the mean temptation
in the two careers by ￿H > ￿L > 0. The compensating di⁄erential for type ￿ for entering the
low-temptation career is









x[f (xj￿H) ￿ f (xj￿L)]dx.
Now hold any ￿L > 0 as ￿xed and consider the di⁄erence V (￿;￿H) ￿ V (￿;￿L). To prove
the proposition it su¢ ces to show that this di⁄erence is decreasing in ￿ because then, for
any ￿H > ￿L; the compensating di⁄erential required to attract individuals into the low-





. Noting that the envelope
38theorem helps us eliminate all terms involving ^ x0 (￿), the di⁄erentiation of (42) with respect
to ￿ yields
V￿ (￿;￿H) ￿ V￿ (￿;￿L) = (43)
(F (^ xj￿H) ￿ F (^ xj￿L))H
0 (￿) ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L) + ￿
Z ^ x
0
x[f (xj￿H) ￿ f (xj￿L)]dx.
Using integration by parts to transform
R ^ x
0 xf (xj￿)dx = ^ xF (^ xj￿) ￿
R ^ x
0 F (xj￿)dx then (43)
becomes
(F (^ xj￿H) ￿ F (^ xj￿L))(H
0 (￿) + ￿^ x) ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿
Z ^ x
0
[F (xj￿H) ￿ F (xj￿L)]dx.































































￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿





This is always positive if
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿




￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿￿
; (48)
which is implied by equation (29).￿
6.1 The role of risk aversion
Here we include a formal explanation of the role of risk aversion in Proposition 1. To see
make things simple, consider an individual that lives only for one period and who faces a
temptation x. We ￿rst verify that expected beliefs after each possible intent are the same,
and then examine expected payo⁄s.
Selecting no intent to resist means that the agent will only resist temptation if she is
truly good, and because good types can only resist, her action will fully reveal her type.
39Therefore, the expected utility from selecting a negative intent is 1 ￿ ￿0 + 0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿0) =
￿0, which is the same as the prior. Selecting a positive intent means that if she is bad
but lucky to have free will she will also see herself pass on the temptation. Therefore,
seeing herself resisting will be compatible both with a good type, and with a bad type
who, having selected a positive intent, was lucky. The posterior she will have then is ^ ￿1 =
￿0=(￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿). Seizing the temptation is only compatible with a bad type who, having
selected a positive intent, was unlucky. The expected belief when selecting a positive intent
is then [￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿] ￿ ￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0 = ￿0, again the prior, as expected. So
we have veri￿ed what we knew to be true from the martingale property of beliefs: expected
beliefs cannot be a⁄ected by one￿ s intent. Now we examine expected payo⁄s. Lack of intent
buys the agent a lottery that generates a prize u(1) with probability ￿0 and a prize u(0)+x
with probability (1 ￿ ￿0). Selecting a positive intent buys her a lottery that yields a prize
u(^ ￿) with probability ￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿ (i.e., in the event that she is good, or in the event
when she is bad, but, having selected a positive intent, is lucky and has free will determining
a good action), and a prize u(0) + x with probability (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿). Selecting a positive
intent is optimal if and only if,
[￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿]u(^ ￿) ￿ ￿0u(1) > ￿(1 ￿ ￿0)x;









> ￿(1 ￿ ￿0)x. (49)
This expression says that the agent, when selecting positive intent, decides to forgo the
temptation x in case she is bad and has free will (which has probability ￿(1 ￿ ￿0)) in order
to obtain a utility gain ￿0 (u(^ ￿1)=^ ￿1 ￿ 1) in terms of thinking better or herself in that
same instance. However, in case she is good she will now only enjoy a posterior equal to ^ ￿1
rather than to 1. Therefore, the net utility gain, which is measured by ￿0 (u(^ ￿1)=^ ￿1 ￿ 1),
is exactly zero when the agent is risk neutral (i.e., when ￿ = 0), because expected beliefs
are invariant in the agent￿ s intent. The utility gain from beliefs is only positive when the
agent is risk averse. Note that the agent, although not improving her expected beliefs, is
reducing the variance of such beliefs. When selecting no intent the variance over beliefs is
E(^ ￿1 ￿ E (^ ￿1))2 = ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿0), but when selecting a positive intent that variance becomes
smaller and equal to ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)￿0=[￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿].














It is easy to see that for any degree of risk aversion, as parameterized by ￿ > 0, there is
a positive cuto⁄ ^ x such that the agent will prefer to pass on temptations below that level
because she prefers a lottery between beliefs zero and ^ ￿1 (with an increased probability to
get ^ ￿1) rather than a lottery between beliefs 0 and 1. It is also easy to see from (50) that
higher degrees of risk aversion will be associated with higher cuto⁄s: Individuals who are
more averse to learning their type will be willing to forgo higher temptations.
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43Figure 1: Timeline for period t
Decision: Intend 
to resist or not
Action: 
resist or not 
Enter period t
with belief ^ µt-1
Enjoy utility 







^ µ temptation xt of free will belief to µt